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
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MEMORANDUM

THE SITUATION IN HANOI

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 July 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Hanoi

Summary

During the period 25 April-10 June 1967 a total of 420 sorties were flown against significant military and economic targets in the Hanoi area, including eight JCS-designated fixed targets. There have been no attacks against such targets since 10 June. The attacks have caused significant disruptions to normal life in Hanoi. There has been, however, no sign of a change in Hanoi's determination to continue the war or in its attitude on a political settlement. Despite the attacks, the discipline of the people and their willingness to endure hardship appear to be holding up.

About one-half of Hanoi's population has been evacuated as have some industries and most of the government ministries. Food and water supplies have become tighter, more expensive and less reliable but all essential requirements continue to be met. The transportation system--both within and leading to Hanoi--performs adequately.

Although the city has only half its normal capacity to generate electric power, a system of rationing, alternative sources of power, and a reduced demand because of dispersal programs make it possible to maintain adequate supplies.



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Table

Major Targets Struck in the Hanoi Area

25 April - 10 June 1967

	Week Beginning*								
	Apr				May				Jun
	<u>9</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>4</u>
Hanoi Transformer Station			2	1			1		
Hanoi Railroad Car Repair Shops, Gia Lam			2						
Hanoi Railroad Highway Bridge			2						
Yen Vien Railroad Classification Yard					1	1			
Ha Dong Army Barracks/Supply Depot					1	1	1	1	
Van Dien Supply /SAM Depot							1		2
Hanoi Thermal Power Plant							1	1	1
Van Dien Vehicle Depot Complex									2
Nguyen Khe Military Storage							1		
Kinh No Vehicle Repair							1		
Bac Mai Motor Pool Facility								1	

*Numbers under weekly columns indicate number of strikes.

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Reappraisal of the Air Strikes Against Targets in Hanoi

Magnitude of the Campaign

1. Since 25 April 1967 a total of eight JCS-designated fixed targets have been struck within a ten mile radius of the city of Hanoi. (See Table) In addition, attacks have been flown against a few important non-JCS targets, SAM sites, and other anti-aircraft installations in the area. There have been no attacks against JCS-fixed targets in the Hanoi area since the 10 June strike against the Hanoi power-plant.

2. During the 20 April-10 June campaign 270 sorties were flown and approximately 500 tons of ordnance were dropped against JCS-designated fixed targets. At least 150 attack sorties were flown against non-JCS fixed targets, SAM and AAA sites, and targets of opportunity within the Hanoi area. These operations are summarized in the tabulation below:

<u>Type of Target</u>	<u>Number of Targets</u>	<u>Attack Sorties</u>	<u>Ordnance (Tons)</u>
JCS	8	270	500
Other <u>a/</u>	NA	150	200
	—	—	—
TOTAL	NA	420	700

a/ Comprised of non-JCS targets, SAM sites, and other pre-planned and armed reconnaissance targets such as bridges, barges, storage areas, and AAA sites.


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General Effects

3. The bombing of targets in the Hanoi area has not drastically changed the attitude of the North Vietnamese regime toward continuing the war. It has however, significantly disrupted normal life in the capital. At the end of May the regime announced some steps to ease the difficulties caused by the bombing in the Hanoi area, including the evacuation of all non-essential people and the construction of additional air raid shelters. The population was advised to store kerosene and kerosene lamps and to dig communal wells.

4. The evacuation program which the regime has been promoting for well over a year was more rigidly enforced



only able-bodied people between the ages of 20 and 40 are said to remain in Hanoi, presumably to carry on essential economic activity.

5. Reports also indicate that all of the North Vietnamese government ministries except Foreign Affairs and National Defense have been evacuated, leaving only a skeleton staff in Hanoi. Foreign embassies and legations have been told they are welcome to evacuate 60 kilometers northwest of Hanoi. None have accepted the invitation.



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7. Food rations in Hanoi are being maintained at minimum of 13 kilograms (28.6 pounds) per person per month with the help of food imports from the other Communist countries; however, the percentage of wheat flour or other secondary crops making up part of the rice ration has increased.

8. Official food prices in Hanoi have not risen but free market prices have gone up since 1966. Although the official price for rice is about 7 cents a pound, the free market price in April 1967 was over 45 cents a pound. Meat is in short supply and the normal meat ration of 150 grams (5.3 ounces) per month is being met with fat.

9. The amount of damage to civilian structures in Hanoi is remarkably light in view of the intensity of the attacks on relatively small but heavily defended targets in areas close to civilian housing. An intensive analysis of post-strike photography through the 10 April-22 May period of heavy attacks against Hanoi reveals only 181 civilian structures destroyed or damaged, 135 of which were located along one target, the Yen Vien Railroad Classification Yard. It is probable that an additional 150 houses were damaged or destroyed as a result of attacks against the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant, the Ha Dong Army Barracks and Supply Depot, and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot early in June.

Transportation

10. Transportation within Hanoi continues much as it has in past months. There are no indications of a shortage of gasoline

there are no indications that the electric power shortage has affected the use of the street car system.

11. The requirement for transportation within Hanoi has also been reduced by the evacuation of

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all people not engaged in essential activity. Large numbers of people normally rely on bicycles, tricycles, and ox carts for transportation. Thus, essential passenger and intra-city freight transportation is being maintained.

12. The air strikes have been successful in destroying, or damaging key rail and highway bridges and interdicting important rail yards and sidings, linking Hanoi with the rest of the country, but North Vietnamese repair efforts, aided by Chinese Communist engineering units, have been adequate to maintain traffic. Virtually all the major bridges on the rail lines leading into Hanoi from the north and east have been bypassed, and in some cases, more than one type of bypass is employed. A bypass to the damaged Hanoi railroad highway bridge, for example, was in service within a month of the attack, and the original bridge was completely repaired within six weeks.

13. Although the bombing of the rail system has produced some adverse effects, the system still has the capability of transporting sufficient quantities to support North Vietnam's economy and war effort. Rail transportation into Hanoi continues. Although it is disrupted occasionally, it is never completely stopped. The important roads and waterways leading to Hanoi have been attacked repeatedly, causing some difficulties in transport operations but repairs and countermeasures have effectively maintained traffic movements. In general, the combined rail, road, and water transport system into Hanoi has ample capacity and provides a flexible network for the movement of supplies. If any one mode is interdicted, the others are available to ensure the continuation of traffic.

Electric Power

14. Available electric power supply in the Hanoi area currently is estimated at 20,000 kw to 25,000 kw. Since late in May, as a result of bomb damage to 3 of 7 boilers, the Hanoi powerplant has been operating at about one-half its rated capacity of 32,500 kw.

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supply is sufficient to cover 40 percent to 50 percent of normal demands.

15. Normal pre-strike power demands for the city of Hanoi and vicinity ranged from 50,000 kw to 60,000 kw. This demand was furnished by the Hanoi powerplant, and by power drawn from the main transmission network through the Dong Anh substation north of the city. All of the main powerplants feeding the network and the Dong Anh substation are out of operation. In each case, restoration of these facilities to partial operation will require three months or longer. The installation of additional diesel generating equipment could supplement the available power supply but there is little prospect of significantly improving Hanoi's power capacity before late summer.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The dispersal of the population and of some industry has reduced the normal pre-strike demand for power. It is likely, therefore, that the regime is still able to staisfy all essential power demands in Hanoi.

Morale in Hanoi

17. Morale, defined in terms of the discipline of the people, their confidence in the regime, and their willingness to endure hardship, appears to be holding up in Hanoi. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the people are adequately fed and clothed and that their general attitude ranges from enthusiasm for the war effort to one of resignation to enduring further hardships. There have been no reports of open opposition to the regime.

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18. The regime's efforts to keep up the level of morale has been abetted in Hanoi by the evacuation of all non-essential people, leaving primarily young

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men and women--the element of North Vietnamese society most enthusiastic about the war and most responsive to regime propaganda.

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19. The evacuation of old folks and children to the countryside has, however, placed a considerable strain on the younger people who have to commute as best they can from Hanoi to the relocation areas in order to see their families. The main burden of establishing the evacuated people in relocation centers and of housing and feeding them appears to have fallen on the evacuees themselves. The regime reportedly has done little to aid in this problem.

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North Vietnam's Political Attitude

21. Authoritative statements by North Vietnamese leaders in recent weeks have shown no change in Hanoi's attitude toward a political settlement of the war or in its determination to pursue the war until a settlement is reached on its terms. The DRV Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, was quoted by an Austrian Communist newsman on 2 July as

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reiterating the stand he originally spelled out in January 1967 that North Vietnam would agree to talks if the US unconditionally ends its air strikes and all other acts of war against the DRV.

22. Other reports from sources who have talked with North Vietnamese and Liberation Front officials in various world capitals confirm that the current line out of Hanoi is the same as it has been for the last six months. In Paris, for example, the DRV press representative recently told []

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[] that the only condition necessary to bring about peace negotiations was a stop to the bombing of North Vietnam. In mid-June the DRV ambassador to Czechoslovakia affirmed that the cessation of the bombing remains the only precondition for negotiations. On 26 June, a Liberation Front official in Zurich told [] that the only way the war in Vietnam can end is if the US adheres completely to Hanoi's four points.

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23. Hanoi's propaganda treatment of the war in South Vietnam remains the same as usual, boasting of alleged victories and confidently predicting ultimate success for the Communist forces. Regime statements continue to predict a further buildup of US forces but affirm the ability of the "liberation forces" to cope with the anticipated increase.

24. In short, it appears to be business as usual in Hanoi. There is, however, fairly good evidence that a foreign policy review is currently taking place in North Vietnam. A number of DRV diplomats have been noted returning home in recent weeks, suggesting that the regime wishes to consult with them and to give them some instructions. No hint has been given as yet, however, as to the substance of this review. In past years, similar gatherings of DRV diplomats have been noted but no firm correlation can be made between such recalls and major policy changes on the part of North Vietnam.

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